Search

Showing posts with label insufficiency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insufficiency. Show all posts

Tuesday, 5 July 2011

If you think this is big, you should've seen the one that got away... MedImmune v Novartis [2011] EWHC 1669

…Call me Ishmael. Some years ago – never mind how long precisely – having little or no money in my purse, and nothing particular to interest me on TV, I thought I would commence reading some patent judgments and see a bit of the workings of the law.

Chief among my motives was the overwhelming idea of the great whale of a judgment itself. Such a portentous and mysterious monster roused all my curiosity. Then the wild and distant seas of jurisprudence where he rolled his island bulk; the undeliverable, nameless perils of the whale; these, with all the attending marvels of a thousand Patentability and Infringement-related sights and sounds, helped to sway me to my wish. With other Kats, perhaps, such things would not have been inducements; but as for me, I am tormented with an everlasting itch for things remote. I love to sail forbidden seas, and land on barbarous coasts (bordered, no doubt, by the treacherous rocks of prior art). And so I set sail...
Uttering profound apologies to the memory of Herman Melville for hijacking his text; this Kat believes his quest may be over. Sighted this morning, breaking the surface just off the Strand, the judgment of Mr Justice Arnold in MedImmune v Novartis [2011] EWHC 1669 (Pat) certainly fits the legend.

In characteristic style, the judgment is as comprehensive as one would wish. To be fair, this is not a simple case, dealing as it does with issues of infringement and validity of a family of patents in the field of biotechnology and immunology. The issues covered in the judgment span the gamut from construction and infringement through priority, obviousness and insufficiency to added matter. Nevertheless, containing a little over 71,000 words spread over 578 paragraphs and 161 pages - registering as a full 8.4 on the Arnold Scale - this is no lightweight. It is a judgment that one can almost hear proclaim “this is the law” (in a style redolent, no doubt, of Chris Morris introducing the news in The Day Today (see 0:25 in the clip)), before adding “and there are some factual matters too. Quite a few actually…”

For the budding pharmacologists and biotechnologists amongst you, the judgment commences with a rather nice introduction to the science of amino acids, proteins, nucleic acids, genes and genetic engineering. For those less interested in these matters, the discussion of the legal stuff commences around [91]. First, however, the context.

Background
Evidently, there were some patents. The precise relationship between them requires this diagram (left) to explain. The patents were owned jointly by MedImmune and MRC, who alleged that they had been infringed by Novartis’ sales of ranibizumab, a pharmaceutical product sold under the trade mark Lucentis and is approved for the treatment of an eye condition known as wet age-related macular degeneration. Novartis counterclaimed challenging the priority of the patents, and also threw the invalidity kitchen sink at the claimants by alleging obviousness and insufficiency as well as challenging it on the basis of added matter.The Judge commenced his discussion of the law by identifying the skilled person – a team a team consisting of an immunologist and a molecular biologist with some experience in antibody engineering/protein chemistry/cell biology. He then considered the duties and responsibilities of the expert witnesses, noting that:
[114] “The law reports are littered with cases, including some patent cases, in which judges have criticised expert witnesses for failing to be objective or in other ways. It is regrettably true that from time to time an expert witness does succumb to the temptation of giving partisan evidence, and that is clearly unacceptable. But I wish to emphasise that the lawyers who instruct expert witnesses bear a heavy responsibility for ensuring that an expert witness is not put in a position where he can be made to appear to have failed in his duty to the court even though he conscientiously believes that he has complied with that duty. It is also important that courts should be cautious about criticising an expert witness purely on the basis of omissions from his report unless it is clear that the fault lies with the expert rather than those instructing him, bearing in mind that the court will not usually be privy to the expert’s full instructions (whatever may be the effect of CPR r. 35.10(4), which it is not necessary to go into for present purposes).”
With this in mind, Arnold J turned his attention to the experts in the case. Following some discussion on the matter, all were considered to have complied with their duties to the court.

Construction
Issues of construction are dealt with between [249] and [302]. There is little to report: the summary of the law given in Virgin Atlantic v Premium Aircraft Interiors [2009] EWCA Civ 1062, [2010] RPC 8 was applied and the relevant phrases found within the claims were construed in light of the specification and drawings. No dictionaries were harmed (or even mentioned) in the construction of the claims, which can only be a good thing.

Priority
Moving, then, to the question of priority (see [303] to [345]), the Judge referred to his own earlier opinion in Intervet UK v Merial [2010] EWHC 294 (Pat), which the parties agreed was an accurate summary of the relevant principles. Accordingly, the essential question was whether the relevant patents could find support from matters disclosed in the prior application – in this case a document referred to as PD3 (UK Patent Application No 9 024 503, filed 12 Nov 1990). Following in-depth consideration of the technical disclosure of PD3, Arnold J concluded that Novartis’ attack succeeded: neither of the claims under investigation were entitled to priority from PD3 – the earlier document’s disclosure had not directly and unambiguously given the skilled person what was in the claim whose priority was in question.

Obviousness
When assessing the obviousness of the patents, the Judge applied the tried and tested Pozolli reformulation of the classis Windsurfing test. There were two pieces of prior art over which the patents were claimed to be obvious: the first was a paper referred to as Parmley & Smith, and the second was a conference paper delivered by Professor Smith (of Parmley & Smith fame) in Banbury. Whereas the published paper was not considered to render the claimed inventions obvious, the Judge considered that:
[411] “…there can be no serious dispute that Professor Smith’s talk made it obvious to try phage display of antibodies provided that there was a sufficient expectation of success having regard to the other factors considered above. The only question is whether it would have given the skilled team a reasonable expectation of success within a reasonable time.”
The main issue was accordingly whether it was obvious to try the techniques described in the talk. Mr Justice Arnold explained that his
[412] “…assessment of the evidence as a whole is that the message Professor Smith conveyed was a positive one: he was reasonably confident of success, while recognising that success was not guaranteed because there were potential problems. Furthermore, as the skilled team would have appreciated, his confidence was not the result of blind optimism, but of the work and scientific analysis he had undertaken.”
The Judge continued, noting that:
[420] “Subject to consideration of the secondary evidence relied on by each side, the conclusion which I draw from the evidence is that Professor Smith’s talk at the Banbury Conference would have given the skilled team a reasonable expectation of success within a reasonable time. Not merely did he explicitly propose antibody phage display, but in addition he said that he was going to do the experiment. Furthermore, he addressed the concerns which arose out of Parmley & Smith and gave reasons as to why he nevertheless considered the experiment worth carrying out, as well as explaining potential solutions if problems were encountered. Finally, his tone was one of encouragement.”
Following discussion of the secondary evidence – some of which was alleged to suggest that the claimed inventions were not obvious (including Professor Smith’s own work in which he expressed disappointment with the results of some relevant experiments (see discussion at [431]), the reaction to the invention ([437])), and some the opposite (that other people had the same idea at around the same time (see [438] to [455])) – the Judge concluded that the claimed inventions were obvious in light of the prior art. He noted that:
[457] “…the Opposition Division rejected the allegation that 877 was obvious over Professor Smith’s talk at the Banbury Conference. This was on the ground, however, that “the contents of the oral disclosure by Dr Smith in April 1990 have not been sufficiently substantiated”: see [17.2]. It appears that the only evidence before the Opposition Division on this point was a declaration of Dr Plückthun (which is not in evidence before me) and Professor Smith’s grant application. By contrast, in the present case I have had the benefit of detailed evidence from Professor Smith. Furthermore, in the light of that evidence, MedImmune did not dispute the content of the disclosure.”
Insufficiency
Moving on to the question of insufficiency, the Judge explained that
[458] “A patent is invalid “if the specification does not disclose the invention clearly enough and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art” (section 72(1)(c) of the 1977 Act). Unlike section 32(1)(f) of the Patents Act 1949, the 1977 Act does not provide that it is a ground of invalidity that “any claim of the complete specification is not fairly based on the matter disclosed in the specification”. This is because no such ground is provided for by the EPC. Nor has the position changed in this respect following the coming into force of EPC 2000.”
Nevertheless, the House of Lords had considered, on no less than three occasions, how an overly broad claim might be struck down if mistakenly granted (in Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1; Kirin-Amgen Inc v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] RPC 9; and Generics (UK) Ltd v H. Lundbeck A/S [2009] UKHL 12, [2009] RPC 13 – a useful summary of the findings of the last case is found at [475]).

Turning to the facts before him, Arnold J explained (at [485]) that the relevant claims were “method claims of fairly broad scope, and not claims to a single product.” To this extent, he noted, the facts were “much closer to Biogen v Medeva and Kirin-Amgen v Hoechst than it is to Generics v Lundbeck”.

He concluded that MedImmune was –
[491] “… correct to characterise the invention disclosed in the Patents as a principle of general application. At its core, it is a technique for selecting a binding molecule of interest from amongst a potentially large population of other binding molecules. The technique does not depend on the precise identity of the binding molecule. On the contrary, part of the usefulness of technique is that it can be applied to a diverse range of binding molecules, fragments and derivatives. Nor does the technique depend on the precise application which the user has in mind. Nor does implementation of the technique for the purpose of a new application involve undue burden on the part of the skilled team….”
Accordingly, the relevant claims were not invalid on grounds of insufficiency.

Added Matter
A patent is invalid, according to s72(1)(d) PA 1977 if “the matter disclosed in the specification of the patent extends beyond that disclosed in the application for the patent, as filed”. Lord Justice Jacob had summarised this (when Jacob J) in Richardson-Vicks’ Patent [1995] RPC 568 at 576 (this wording being subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeal in Vector Corp v Glatt Air Techniques Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 805, [2008] RPC 10) as follows:

“I think the test of added matter is whether a skilled man would, upon looking at the amended specification, learn anything about the invention which he could not learn from the unamended specification.”

Applying this to the facts, Mr Justice Arnold was of the opinion that the specification as filed contained clear disclosure of the relevant material and the claims of the patents in issue accordingly did not disclose any new matter.

Infringement
Turning finally to the issue of infringement, MedImmune had alleged that the process by which Novartis manufactured ranibizumab fell within their claims, and that accordingly the ranibizumab so produced was a product obtained directly by means of that process. This was important as the process in question was carried out in the U.S. and therefore s60(1)(b) could not bite (it requiring that the process be used in the UK). This left only s60(1)(c).

Novartis denied that the ranibizumab it produced was made by the patented process. The Judge agreed. Accordingly, there could be no infringement, but Arnold J nevertheless went on to consider the meaning of “product obtained directly” within s60(1)(c). He noted that the leading English authority on the section was the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pioneer Electronics Capital Inc v Warner Music Manufacturing Europe GmbH [1997] RPC 757. This he stated (at [539]) had “decided that a product could be obtained directly from a claimed process despite further processing provided that there was no loss of identity, there being no such loss where it retained its essential characteristics.” Rejecting Novartis’ arguments to the contrary, the Judge therefore concluded (at [549]) that if Novartis’ ranibizumab had been produced by a process falling within the relevant claims of MedImmune’s patents then it would have been a product obtained directly by means of that process, infringing under s60(1)(c). This conclusion was not affected by Art 8(2) of the Biotech Directive.

And thus, the whale is beached.

Friday, 1 October 2010

Novartis AG & Cibavision AG v. Johnson & Johnson [2010] EWCA Civ 1039

The Court of Appeal roared back into action yesterday with its first patent decision of the new term: Novartis AG & Cibavision AG v. Johnson & Johnson [2010] EWCA Civ 1039 (available on Bailii here). Novartis and Cibavision appealed against the decision of Kitchin J ([2009] EWHC 1671 (Pat) – reported by the IPKat here), in which he had held that whilst Johnson & Johnson’s (J&J) Oasys contact lenses fell within the scope of claims 1 and 24 of Novartis’ European Patent (EP (UK) No. 819,258), the Patent itself was, however, invalid on grounds of insufficiency. J&J had also contended that the Patent was invalid for obviousness and lack of novelty, but these arguments were rejected at first instance.

The appeal centres around the issue of insufficiency, and J&J’s contingent cross-appeals (to be deployed if the insufficiency appeal was successful) got nary a look-in.The tone of the Court is apparent from the outset. Describing claim 1 of the patent, Jacob LJ noted:

"[10] “The reader might be forgiven for initially supposing that this apparently detailed list of elements would lead to a monopoly of reasonably defined scope, that each of the elements actually meant something by way of delineating the monopoly. But the reader would be wrong. Upon analysis it turns out that the elements are mostly meaningless and what is left is no more than a claim to a lens made from two types of polymer, provided it works.”

He continued:

"[19] Accordingly there is a lot to be said for the view that the claim should never have been allowed as not complying with Art. 84 of the EPC. This requires that:

The claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought. They shall be clear and concise and supported by the description.

Unfortunately failure to comply with Art. 84 is not itself a ground of invalidity. However some of the grounds which are available for an invalidity attack overlap with Art.84. The jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal has had to deal with undue width of claim by resorting to either the requirement of non-obviousness or that of sufficiency or both. As will be seen I think they come into play here.”

However, the hammer-blow comes slightly further on into the judgment:

"[50] So we come to an astonishing conclusion. Although the claim has a number of elements, hardly any of them have any significance. The claim is to a lens made from a polymeric material consisting of two vast classes of polymerisable materials, one having a high oxygen diffusion rate and the other having a high ion or water diffusion rate provided the lens “works”. In substance the claim amounts to this: “if you try any pair of polymers, to see if they work (perhaps only after surface treatment) and find anything that does, we claim it.”

[51] What help does the teaching of the Patent give the reader to find a combination of polymers which “works?” The answer is again astonishing - hardly anything.”

Skipping on a little, Jacob LJ continues:

“[70] The only way the Patent offers to find out whether you have got everything right is to test it. You can test for oxygen transmissibility. But then you are on your own. You will have to do a clinical trial. If it “works” well and good – but that would tell you nothing about the remainder of the vast ambit of the claim.

[71] If it does not “work” then the Patent does not help you as to what to do next. Generally patents with functional claims give you guidance as to what to do if you embark on a trial and error process. The reader can learn from the errors so as to reach something that works. But not here.”

Thus, readers will not be surprised that the patent was held to be insufficient. Jacob LJ summarised his conclusions with damning criticism of the patent before him:

“[92] The upshot of all this is that the Judge was entirely right to decide that the Patent was insufficient. It is no more than a “if you can find it, we claim it” patent. Its avaricious ambit coupled with its failure to provide any help makes it nothing but a hazard to those conducting research into extended wear contact lenses. It should be revoked in its entirety. There is no need to consider any of the other points raised.”

Ouch!

History of contact lenses: here

When contact lenses attack: here


Thursday, 23 July 2009

Comfy lenses, shame about the patent ...

It was decided rather earlier this month, but the ruling of Mr Justice Kitchin in Novartis AG and Cibavision AG v Johnson & Johnson Ltd and another [2009] EWHC 1671 (Pat) has taken a while to reach the top of the IPKat's must-blog pile. 356 paragraphs can take a long time for a Kat to read and, though he hates to admit it, even longer to get the hang of what it's all about.

In brief, Novartis claimed that J&J's Acuvue Oasys products infringed its European patent for extended-wear silicone hydrogel contact lenses that could be left in the eye overnight or even for several days. J&J counterclaimed for revocation on the bases of insufficiency (ie the teaching in the invention as disclosed did not provide sufficient information for the person skilled in the art to make contact lenses within or across the range of the claims without undue experimentation), lack of novelty and absence of inventive step.

Kitchin J ruled that the patent was invalid for lack of sufficiency. He reasoned as follows:
* As to lack of novelty, it had to be shown that the prior art contained a clear description of, or clear instructions to make, something that would necessarily infringe the patentee's claim if carried out after the grant of the patent. Since the examples in two earlier patent applications cited by J&J did not satisfy all the requirements of any of the patent's claims, this burden of proof had not been met.

* The way of making a silicone hydrogel lens which was ophthalmically compatible over a period of extended wear was not obvious in the light of (i) the common general knowledge or (ii) the content of three earlier cited patents.

* For a patent to be valid its specification had to disclose the invention in a way that was sufficiently clear and complete for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art. In this context, the specification had to enable the invention to be performed to the full extent of the monopoly claimed (citing Biogen Inc v Medeva).

* Whether the specification disclosed an invention clearly and completely enough for it to be performed by a person skilled in the art involved a question of degree: the specification need not set out every detail necessary for performance, but the skilled person should not be required to carry out any prolonged research, enquiry or experiment.

* In this case, the ion permeability values taught by the patent and set by the claims were "extremely confusing and of little or no practical assistance to the skilled person seeking to make an ophthalmically compatible lens suitable for extended wear": it would require a research programme to identify silicone hydrogel formulations which were useful for producing such lenses.
Says the IPKat, this judgment has some interesting material on priority (paras 113 to 140), and a whole mini-thesis on insufficiency (paras 230 to 323). Kitchin J bases his reasoning on the House of Lords decision in Lundbeck, which he sees as reaffirming the reasoning in Biogen, both support the basic rule for sufficiency (see paras 233-234). He cites Lord Hoffmann quoting the Technical Board of Appeal of the EPO in Exxon/Fuel Oils (T 409/91) [1994] O.J. EPO 653: "the extent of the patent monopoly ... should correspond to the technical contribution to the art in order for it to be supported, or justified" (para 233).

Merpel adds: if you want to know all about the place of silicone 3-(methacryloxy)propyl tris(trimethysiloxyl)silane (TRIS) in the history of silicone hydrogel development, or the use of SANS, SAXS, TEM, EDX, AFM, DSC and FEGSTEM in the analysis of microphase structures, you will find the judge's analysis quite un-put-downable.

The Dutch proceedings, in which the same patent is held valid and infringed, here
Contact lenses for cats here
Wild Cat contact lenses here
Cats' eyes here

Followers